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Louisiana's Division of Administrative Law: An
Independent Administrative Hearings Tribunal*
By Ann Wise**
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice and due process are primordial rights of humans.'
Almost twelve years ago, Louisiana joined a growing
trend and created a centralized, executive branch, administrative
hearings tribunal. The "central panel" movement has been strong,
and more than half the states have adopted some form of quasi-
judicial tribunal, including most southern states, 2 in addition to
California, 3 Oregon, Washington, Arizona, Colorado, Wyoming, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, Maine,
Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and most
* This article was originally published by the Louisiana Law Review in 2008
and can be located at 68 La. L. Rev. 1169 (2008). J. NAALJ obtained the
permission to reprint this article from both the Louisiana Law Review and the
author.
** Ann Wise is the founding Director of the Division of Administrative Law
(DAL), and has served in this position since 1996. She is a 1980 graduate of the
LSU Law Center.
1. John Hardwicke, former Chief Administrative Law Judge, Maryland
Office of Administrative Hearings, stated this in remarks before the Central Panel
Directors Conference, Greensboro, NC, November 1, 2007, entitled
"Administrative Law: Beginnings."
2. These states are: Texas, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, North
Carolina, Tennessee, and Maryland. South Carolina declared its central panel an
"Administrative Law Court," and "an agency and a court of record within the
executive branch of the government of this State," 2004 S.C. Acts No. 202, § 3.
3. California established the nation's first central panel in 1946.
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recently, Alaska.' Washington, D.C. has a central panel-placing the
U.S. Supreme Court within its geographic jurisdiction. Some large
cities, including Chicago and to some extent, New York, as well as
our French-speaking neighbors in Qudbec, Canada, have structured
their myriad of administrative hearings into a central office.
What is a central panel? It is "a cadre of professional adjudicators
who are administratively independent of the agencies whose cases they
hear, and thus, they are removed from agency influence."'
Why are they created? The justification for an independent
central panel is basic fairness; it is not fair to combine into one
person or political entity all of these powers: to investigate (like
police), to decide whether to bring charges (like grand juries), to
prosecute (like district attorneys), and to decide guilt or innocence
(like judges or juries). Americans feel strongly about these
basic tenets of justice: "This is the American way."6 When a
government agency threatens to take away or deny a license, or
demand money penalties, people want the opportunity to appear
before an impartial adjudicator who is not controlled by the same
agency as the investigator and prosecutor. They want an independent
review of the facts and the law. When a central panel's purpose is
explained to average citizens, almost without fail they support it.
People want and deserve to feel that they are getting a "fair
shake" in a dispute with a state agency.7  It is critical to
citizens to know they had their day in court and that they were
treated fairly.
4. The states of Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky have been studying the concept
for possible implementation. There is some centralization of hearings in
Pennsylvania and Hawaii, but those states have not yet fully realized as central
panels. See Frank Sullivan Jr., Some Questions to Consider Before Indiana
Creates a Centralized Office of Administrative Hearings, 38 IND. L. REV. 389
(2005).
5. James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law
Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ Authority and Standards of
Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
6. House of Representatives Floor Debate on H.B. 41, 2008 1st Extra. Sess.
(now La. Acts No. 23), Feb. 15, 2008 (statement by Rep. Jim Tucker explaining a
proposal to transfer certain hearings to the DAL).
7. See Edward J. Schoenbaum's treatment of this issue in Improving Public
Trust and Confidence in Administrative Adjudication: What an Administrative Law
Judge Can Do, 21 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1 (2001).
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II. HISTORY OF THE DAL ACT
The Division of Administrative Law (DAL) began on October 1,
1996 as the state's centralized administrative hearings tribunal.8 Act
739 was signed into law by Governor Buddy Roemer in 1995. It had
been passed before, and vetoed by Governor Roemer in 1991.9 The
history of Louisiana's administrative hearings tribunal is a story
familiar to other states that have established central panels. The
concept is commonly met with skepticism, vigorous agency
resistance, predictions of doom, and eventually-after it has been
implemented and the benefits experienced-mostly welcome
acceptance.10
8. 1995 La. Acts No. 739, § 4. Section 2 of that act enacted chapter 13-B,
comprised of Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 49:991-99.
9. S.B. 600, Reg. Sess. (La. 1991) (submitted by Senator Bankston). The
veto message may be found at pages 596-99 of the Resume of Acts, Resolutions,
Study Requests and Vetoed Bills of the 1991 session of the Louisiana legislature.
10. A number of articles, many by other central panel directors and chiefs,
outline similar experiences. See Thomas E. Ewing, Chief Administrative Law
Judge, Oregon's Hearing Officer Panel, 23 J. NAT'L A. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 57
(2003) [hereinafter Ewing, Oregon 's Panel]; Thomas E. Ewing, Oregon 's Office of
Administrative Hearings: A Postscript, 24 J. NAT'L A. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 21
(2004); Thomas E. Ewing, Independence in Adjudication, Understanding the Office
of Administrative Hearings, 65-APR OR. ST. B. BULL. 17 (2005). See also
Deborah A. Baumer, The Office of Administrative Hearings, 30-OCT WYo. LAW.
20 (2007); George R. Coan, Operational Aspects of a Central Hearing Examiners
Pool. California's Experiences, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 86 (1975); Jeffrey G. Colvin
& Jonathan Mallamud, Hearing Officers in Pennsylvania: Recommendations for an
Independent Central Office, 15 DuQ. L. REv. 605 (1977); Mark A. Dickerson, The
Georgia Office of State Administrative Hearings, 19 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L.
JUDGES 121 (1999); William R. Dorsey, Florida's Continuing Experiment with the
Central Hearing Panel Process: The Division of Administrative Hearings, 15 J.
NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 77 (1995); Edwin L. Felter, Jr., The Hidden
Executive Branch Judiciary: Colorado's Central Panel Experience-Lessons for the
Feds, 14 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 95 (1994); James F. Flanagan, Report to
the Judicial Council on the Administrative Law Judge Statute, 18 J. NAT'L ASs'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 371 (1998) (on South Carolina); John W. Hardwicke, The
Central Hearing Agency: Theory and Implementation in Maryland, 14 J. NAT'L
ASs'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 5 (1994) [hereinafter Hardwicke, The Central Hearing
Agency]; Duane R. Harves, Making Administrative Proceedings More Efficient and
Effective: How the ALJ Central Panel System Works in Minnesota, 65 JUDICATURE
257 (198 1); Daniel R. E. Jordan, Opening the Floodgates of Decision-Making at the
97Spring 2010 Louisiana's Division of Administrative Law
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Frequently, a central panel is the result of some motivating event
within the state that creates sufficient momentum to overcome strong
opposition from within agencies. In Louisiana, this momentum was
created after a few cases in which administrative respondents' due
process rights were violated. Students of "admin law" study the 1989
Allen v. La. Board of Dentistry case." The due process rights of
physicians were violated when the board's findings of fact and
conclusions of law were drafted ex parte by the board's prosecutor.
An Attorney General opinion in 1990 warned against an agency's
assistant secretary sitting as a voting member of an administrative
board and then appointing the hearing officer who would decide the
administrative appeal from decision of the same board.'2 "The
procedure followed by the Assistant Secretary in these cases is
Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission, 15 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L.
JUDGES 99 (1995); Marvin Kittrell, ALJs in South Carolina, 7 S.C. LAW. 42
(May/June 1996); Raymond Krause, Minnesota's OAH: 30 Years of Innovation in
Administrative Review, 63-FEB BENCH & B. MINN. 17 (2006); Julian Mann, III,
Administrative Justice: No Longer Just A Recommendation, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1639
(2001); Julian Mann, III, Striving for Efficiency in Administrative Litigation: North
Carolina's Office of Administrative Hearings, 15 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L.
JUDGES 221 (1995); Christopher B. McNeil, Due Process and the Ohio
Administrative Procedure Act: The Central Panel Proposal, 23 OHIO N.U.L. REV.
783 (1997); William B. Sweet, South Carolina's ALJ: Central Panel,
Administrative Court, or a Little of Both?, 48 S.C. L. REV. 1 (1996); Sheila Bailey
Taylor, The Growth and Development of a Centralized Administrative Hearings
Process in Texas, 17 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 113 (1997). For central
panels generally, see Ron Beal, The Texas State Office ofAdministrative Hearings:
Establishing Independent Adjudications in Contested Case Proceedings While
Preserving the Power ofInstitutional Decision Making, 25 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN.
L. JUDGES 119 (2005); John W. Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement: A Work
in Progress, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 419 (2001) [hereinafter Hardwicke, The Central
Panel Movement]; Allen C. Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central
Panels in the 1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 75 (1994), reprinted in 14 J. NAT'L ASS'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 107 (1994); Allen C. Hoberg, Ten Years Later: The Progress of
State Central Panels, J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 235 (2001); Harold
Levinson, The Central Panel System: A Framework That Separates ALIs from
Administrative Agencies, 65 JUDICATURE 236 (1981); Malcolm Rich, Adapting the
Central Panel System: A Study of Seven States, 65 JUDICATURE 246 (1981); Malcolm
Rich, Central Panels of Administrative Law Judges: An Introduction, 65 JUDICATURE
233 (1981); Victor Rosenblum, The Central Panel System: Enhancing
Administrative Justice, 65 JUDICATURE 235 (1981).
II. 543 So. 2d 908 (La. 1989).
12. La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 90-83, 1990.
analogous to a district judge having the power to appoint the three
judge appellate panel hearing the appeal from his trial judgment."' 3
Two Department of Environmental Quality cases were apparently
on the minds of legislators, according to discussions with the original
author of the bill and prior legislators who were members of the
committees who heard the bills. In In the Matter of Rollins
Environmental Services, Inc., the DEQ secretary was recused from
deciding a waste facility permit case because she had investigated the
incident at issue, issued the compliance order to shut down the plant,
and made repeated public statements (including interviews reported
by the Wall Street Journal) regarding her resolve to close the
respondent's entire facility permanently.14
During the year the first central panel bill passed the legislature
(later vetoed), another DEQ secretary was recused from deciding an
adjudication because of prejudicial public statements. The first
circuit noted:
When acting as adjudicators, administrative officers
should conduct themselves as judges do. . . . [T]hey
must realize the importance of the positions of public
trust they hold and endeavor, however difficult, to
avoid any appearance of partiality or prejudgment of
matters either pending or to be pending before them.
The appearance of impartiality and fairness is just as
important as being impartial and fair and is essential
to maintaining the integrity of the administrative
process.' 5
Shortly before DAL came into existence, another state agency
violated administrative due process. In Georgia Gulf Corporation v.
Board of Ethics for Public Employees, the state supreme court
13. Id.
14. 481 So. 2d 113 (La. 1985). When she appointed a hearing officer to
handle the adjudicatory hearing, she even directed him not to consider nor
recommend any sanctions, reserving that decision for herself.
15. In re Am. Waste & Pollution Control Co., 581 So. 2d 738, 741-42 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1991). For a good discussion of the fairness requirement as it applies
to administrative law, see Bernard Schwartz, Bias in Webster and Bias in
Administrative Law-The Recent Jurisprudence, 30 TULSA L. J. 461 (1995).
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declared it impermissible for the Board of Ethics to commingle
prosecutorial and adjudicative roles by allowing the commission's
prosecutor and counsel to prepare its decision. The court explained
that a party denied the right to a neutral decision maker is denied due
process.' 6 The court stated:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process. . . . This applies to administrative
agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts. . . . Not
only is a biased decision maker constitutionally
unacceptable but our system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of
unfairness.17
It was against this backdrop, and the acceleration of the central
panel movement in other states, that the DAL Act emerged. The
minutes of the legislative committee hearings concerning the
enabling legislation and subsequent amendments show the
legislators' desire to establish a centralized agency where ALJs could
render decisions without fear of offending their appointing authority.
Over the intervening twelve years, there were numerous failed
attempts to weaken the DAL Act. Testimony from those hearings
highlighted the concerns that led to the Act's passage, and its ability
to withstand subsequent annual attacks.' 8
The DAL Act, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:991, et seq,
provide that the division shall handle all adjudications of any state
agency of the executive branch of state government. There are
specified exemptions, notably Departments of Labor and Agriculture
cases, boards and commissions, the Public Service Commission, and
16. 694 So. 2d 173 (La. 1997).
17. Id. at 177 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). See also
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
18. For discussion of SB 636 (which became the DAL Act), see the minutes of
the May 23, 1995 meeting of the House and Governmental Affairs committee and
the May 10, 1995 meeting of the Senate and Governmental Affairs committee. For
discussion of HB 2206 (which became Louisiana Acts Number 1332), see the
minutes of May 6, 1999 meeting of the House and Governmental Affairs
committee and the June 9, 1999 meeting of the Senate and Governmental Affairs
committee.
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some Department of Natural Resources matters.' 9 There is a broad
and often misinterpreted exemption for agencies that are "required,
pursuant to a federal mandate and as a condition of federal funding,
to conduct or render a final order in an adjudication proceeding ...
."20 The Act is supplemented with rules that govern hearing
procedures.21
III. THE ROLE OF THE DAL DIRECTOR
The administrator of Louisiana's central panel is statutorily
titled the "director." 22 Although this term is common, many states
name this position the "chief administrative law judge," and the
incumbent may hear and decide cases in addition to his or her
administrative duties. 23 The DAL director does not function as an
AU and does not decide the outcome of cases, which is wholly the
duty of the ALJs.
The DAL director is appointed by the governor and confirmed
by the state senate for a fixed, six-year term, and may be
reappointed and confirmed for subsequent six year terms without
limitation. 24 The director's term is intentionally neither "at will"
nor concurrent with an appointing governor's four-year elected term
of office. The legislature wanted to ensure the director's
professionalism and independence from any attempts to use
political influence to sway particular case decisions.
19. The April 2000 Louisiana Legislative Auditor's Report, Analysis of
Overlap, Duplication and Fragmentation across Executive Branch Departments
urged the legislature to consider amending Revised Statutes section 49:992 to
remove some of the exemptions it allows in order to achieve greater economy of
scale by centralizing the administrative hearings function.
20. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:992 (2008).
21. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 1, pt. 3 (2007).
22. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:995 (2008).
23. The title "chief administrative law judge" is used in Florida, Georgia,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Oregon, Washington, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Alaska, and Washington, D.C. Massachusetts uses "Chief Administrative
Magistrate."
24. § 49:995(A), (B)(1). Currently moving through the 2008 Regular Session
is HB 901 which would change the director's term to a fixed four year term,
"subject to the approval of the House of Representatives and confirmation by the
Senate."
Spring 2010 Louisiana's Division of Administrative Law 101
102 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
The director must be a licensed and resident Louisiana attorney
engaged in the practice of law for at least five years prior to
appointment.25 The director is a full-time, unclassified employee,
and "shall not accept or engage in additional employment of any
kind."26 This shields the director from conflicts of interest, as the
DAL's customers are all the agencies, citizens, and businesses in
the state.
Responsibility rests with the director for the overall integrity
and competence of the central panel. It is a job as broad as that of
any state agency chief, with a grant of authority to "[a]dminister
and cause the work of the division to be performed in such a
manner and pursuant to such a program as may be appropriate. "27
This includes responsibility for all hiring, purchasing, compliance
with various state reporting deadlines, responding to audits,
overseeing the employee evaluation program, providing information
to other agencies, testifying before legislative committees,
responding to media inquiries, developing good working
relationships with customer agencies, meeting with appointed and
elected officials, participating in bar associations, responding to law
suits against the agency, managing subordinate supervisors,
preparing and defending agency budgets, promoting the DAL,
complying with a vast amount of laws and regulations, and every
type of problem solving. In short, the director is a public
administrator with a quasi-judicial bent.
The director protects the ALJs' decisional independence by
shielding them from interference and pressure from respondents,
agency personnel, witnesses, or elected officials. The director
reviews and evaluates any complaints received to assure the
competence and fairness of the adjudicatory process, but is not
involved in affecting the outcome of any case. He or she should
passionately guard the decisional independence of the ALJs, while
assuring that the public service provided meets high standards of
competence, timeliness, fairness, and ethics. A good director
performs a fine balancing act. One commentator has noted:
25. § 49:995(A).
26. § 49:995(C). The Director is the only unclassified employee in the entire
Department of Civil Service; the ALJs and support staff are classified civil servants.
27. § 49:996(1).
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It is the [director] who must skillfully and properly
deal with external forces. Indeed, individual ALJs
whose "true and real independence of judgment" is
protected by the existence of a central panel may not
be aware of attacks upon their decisions. In other
words, the [director] should be the lightning rod for
forces intent on challenging the independence and
integrity of decision-makers [ALJs].28
IV. OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE
A. Early Challenges
The first DAL director was appointed only forty-two days before
the October 1, 1996, statutory start of the agency.29  The entire
agency had to be "made from scratch." The ingredients for this new
Louisiana gumbo were the statute itself and the entirely dissimilar
hearings processes, policies, cultures, rules, and personnel among the
agencies. There was no physical office for the agency, there was no
budget yet appropriated, 3  and there were uncertainties regarding
what agencies and employees currently performing adjudicatory
functions were to be transferred into the new DAL. 31 Although the
DAL Act provided in section 3 that state agencies were supposed to
provide information about their employees who performed these
functions, this information was not complete.
Louisiana's experience with agency resistance to the new central
panel was not unlike that of other states.3 2  Some agencies were
28. Hardwicke, supra note 10, at 426.
29. The author took office August 19, 1996.
30. It was not until the end of the 1997 legislative session, and three days
before the end of that fiscal year, that DAL received supplemental appropriations to
repay start up operating costs. 1997 La Acts No. 471.
31. § 49:994(C) (transferring to DAL on October 1, 1996 all persons
employed in affected agencies who handle adjudications).
32. See supra note 10 for articles recounting other central panel chiefs'
experiences. The Director learned that two weeks after DAL began, the Central
Panel Directors were having their annual meeting. The advice and guidance the
other states' chiefs offered about how to set up a central panel was a saving grace.
I profusely thank them for their help and enjoy their continued support.
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helpful and cooperative and transferred personnel, budgets, computer
equipment, and the case files without artifice. Others did not. Some
played "hide and go seek," shifting ALJs and support staff into other
sections of their agencies and giving them new job titles so that on
the transfer date they were no longer officially listed as hearings
personnel. This reduced the number of positions the agencies lost
through transfer to DAL and the dollars budgeted for salaries and
benefits they had to transfer. Another game was to transfer fewer, or
no, positions to DAL, or to transfer lower level vacant positions (with
smaller salaries) instead of the positions matching the experienced
employees who had been performing adjudicatory functions. Some
agencies first agreed to transfer cases, but upon realizing that they
would no longer control the hearings and decisions, they refused to
send them and suddenly discovered vague and unproven exemptions
from the Act.
At first, there was no office space for the DAL. The Department
of Civil Service was generous in its support of the new entity,
providing the director temporary office space, supplies, and
guidance. Later in the year, a few rooms were made available in an
office building (now demolished and replaced), which had been
closed for asbestos containment and repairs. 33 We made it work
because that was all we had.
Agencies were expected to transfer desks, computers, and
operating expenses that had been used by their former adjudicatory
staff to DAL. Some did. One removed the AL's computer
equipment overnight. Another transferred broken and severely
inadequate computers (including antique 150MHz processors) from
which all operating software had been stripped. An agency even
packed up and removed small supplies belonging to the DAL:
staplers, scotch tape, legal pads, and ink pens. The DAL staff was no
longer surprised by anything.
The newly independent ALJs gradually adjusted to seeing
themselves as separate from, and no longer part of, the management
structure of their prior agencies. Most began thinking of themselves
as independent adjudicators. Fresh air flowed. This new "breathing
33. It was only habitable after extensive cleaning and repainting. Used office
furniture and equipment was purchased from a state property surplus warehouse.
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room" revealed some of the less than impartial hearings procedures
that had been acceptable routine.34
Pre-DAL, the ALJs' supervisors frequently were the agency's
prosecuting attorneys who appeared before those ALJs at the
hearings. Some ALJs reported to their agency's general counsel.
The conflict of interest inherent in this arrangement is obvious.
Many ALJs helped prepare the agency's case files to be introduced as
evidence at the hearings. They were required to review the file
before the hearing and determine whether it comprised a prima facie
case supporting the agency's action. If agency documents were
incomplete or missing, the ALJ was expected to request and obtain
them. ALJs reported walking to other sections of their departments
to search out and retrieve the necessary documentation.35 "They
were active, if invisible to the public, prosecutors of the agency's
case." 36
Commonly, agencies referred to the in-house ALJs as "their"
judges. Some ALJs perceived a loss of personal status they had
enjoyed as the judge for the department head. They continued to sign
their decisions as "Judge for the commissioner/secretary of agency"
and balked at changing their decisions' headings to reflect the new
tribunal, Division of Administrative Law. At least one transferred
ALJ did not see it as improper for agency attorneys, immediately
following the public presentation of the state's evidence in a case
before "their" judge, to proceed to further discussions behind closed
doors in the judge's office.37 A legislator openly recounted in
legislative committee meetings his experiences with an agency in-
34. The author discusses this topic to demonstrate the deep structural
justifications for the DAL as an independent central panel, but is specifically not
accusing any current agency personnel of misdeeds. These problems existing over
a decade ago were solved by the implementation and acceptance of the DAL as
described in this article.
35. Upon discovery, the Director ordered that activity to stop immediately.
36. Judges Hardwicke & Thomas E. Ewing, The Central Panel: A Response to
Critics, 24 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 231, 233 (2004) (Judge Ewing
recounting similar practices prior to Oregon's central panel).
37. Some ALJs' offices were conveniently adjacent to the agency attorneys'
offices. Ex parte communications, already prohibited in the APA, are proscribed in
the DAL Act. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:998(F) (2008).
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house judge falling asleep during hearings he had attended,
seemingly without consequence.3 8
A lack of impartiality was apparent, as was a lack of procedural
efficiency. There was little consistency among the agencies
transferred as to process and case procedure, case docketing, content
of decisions, qualifications of hearing officers, accountability, and
statistical record keeping. All of these processes have been made
uniform and consistent for all agencies within the central panel.
Lack of these types of quality assurance wastes state funds and
resources. One agency used a contract ALJ who rarely issued written
decisions or kept records of continued cases; it later found that it
could not collect millions of dollars of outstanding fines.39 When the
DAL began hearing the agency's cases, they were electronically
docketed, case records were kept, and written continuances, orders,
and decisions were issued. Implementation of these processes
dramatically increased citizens' payments of adjudicated fines.
The personnel transferred to DAL remained in their same office
locations at the agencies for which they continued to conduct
hearings. Structural independence on paper was good, but not
sufficient to eliminate interference by customer agencies. Some
agencies strongly indicated that DAL ALJs were no longer welcome
and wanted them moved out. One agency involuntarily moved a
judge in a state office building to a small one room office with no
hearing room and no litigant or witness waiting area.4 0  Physical
38. Rep. Peppi Bruneau repeated this story before the House and
Governmental Affairs Committee on May 6, 1999 during consideration of HB
2206. That bill provides that no agency or agency official is entitled to judicial
review of ALJ decisions. It became Louisiana Acts Number 1332. The DAL Act
specifies that an evaluation of ALJ performance include the judge's
"attentiveness." § 49:997(B)(2).
39. A Financial and Compliance Audit by the Legislative Auditor on May 31,
2000 found that the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries had $2.6 million in
uncollected fines. The Department responded by letter attached to the report, that
"these civil fines are considered by legal counsel to be uncollectible since due
process was not afforded to the violators." The agency noted that there had been
no provisions for due process adjudicatory hearings until the DAL began handling
their hearings in late 1996.
40. DAL's Budget Request for fiscal year 1997-98 is a public document.
Pages 21-22 of the Continuation Budget Package described the hostility from host
agencies and other detriments experienced from having the ALJs housed in the
agencies for which they conducted hearings: compromise of their independence
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separation of the ALJs from their customer agencies was necessary to
insulate them from the continuing opportunity for ex parte
communications and influences. The prosecuting and judging
functions should be separate not only in fact, but also in appearance.
B. Efficiencies Realized from Consolidation of Offices and Personnel
Pre-DAL, the Department of Public Safety hearings had been
handled by hearing officers domiciled in seven separate offices
maintained in Baton Rouge, Lafayette, Shreveport, Metairie, Lake
Charles, Monroe, and West Monroe. After DAL, the caseload
numbers in each location were closely analyzed. The new central
panel was politically free to close low volume locations. The result
was a more efficient and cost effective use of personnel and sharing
of caseloads statewide. 4 1 Today, DAL houses full time ALJs in only
three locations: Baton Rouge, Shreveport and Lafayette. DAL serves
customers in other cities at its hearing rooms in Lake Charles and
Monroe, and at borrowed hearing locations in Metairie,42 Mandeville,
Gray, and Alexandria.
The director made a special appeal at a meeting of the House of
Representatives' Appropriations Committee for funds to rent a
central office and consolidate the five different locations in Baton
Rouge.43 On March 1, 1999, this finally occurred, and the personnel
and agencies were moved into two floors downtown, a few blocks
and impartiality; ex parte communications; procedural inefficiencies from several
different case intake systems, docketing and filing; duplication of overhead
expenses; uneven staffing; and barriers to consolidating workloads.
41. There was insufficient workload in the Monroe area for one full time
office, much less two. Today, DAL leases one small room in Monroe. An ALJ
from the Shreveport office travels there to conduct hearings, usually once weekly.
This equaled a reduction from ten workdays to one in that city, and allowed a
beneficial consolidation of workload so that the Shreveport office could absorb
increased work in its growing metro area. The Lake Charles office was reduced
from a five day a week full-time hearings office to a small room visited one day
about every other week by the ALJ domiciled in Lafayette.
42. The Metairie office had been moved to downtown New Orleans and
expanded with the workload, until the devastating hurricanes of 2005 reduced the
caseload and budget cuts closed that office. It is slated to reopen.
43. Funds were included in 1997 La. Acts No. 18.
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from the state Capitol, with hearing rooms. This was a monumental
improvement in efficiency and impartiality."
Support staff had been abundant at some agencies; scant at
others. It was more efficient and cost effective to centralize and
consolidate the use of all support staff, but some judges naturally
regretted the loss of "their" secretaries, paralegals, or law clerks.
C. Housed in the Department of Civil Service
State agencies are not freely floating entities, and structurally
tend to be "attached" to some department of state government. DAL
was legislatively placed within the Department of State Civil Service
(DSCS). It is a fairly independent and well chosen location. The
director of State Civil Service is not a gubernatorially appointed
cabinet official; rather, he or she is a classified state employee
selected by the State Civil Service Board. The DAL director is the
only unclassified employee in the entire department, and does not
report to, and is not supervised by, the DSCS director. The DAL
does not handle employee civil service appeals by state employees,
as the civil service board's powers are established in the state
constitution. Thus, no conflict of interest exists.
The DSCS provides accounting, payroll, budgeting, human
resource, purchasing, and other support functions to the DAL and
other boards under its umbrella. This has been a cost-effective
sharing of state administrative resources. DSCS has no influence
whatsoever over DAL's ALJs or adjudicatory functions.
D. Budget and Billing
DAL's budget is annually approved by the legislature as part of
the general appropriation bill.45 Currently, most customer agencies
pay DAL a flat rate, through interagency transfer (IAT) of funds from
44. Not all the ALJs wanted to be separate from their parent agencies-
perhaps an indication of their too-cozy relationship. One returned to an AU
position at their original agency which had not been transferred to DAL, and
another voluntarily retired the day before the move. Others resented the loss of
special perks they had enjoyed at their prior agency, such as personally assigned,
take-home state vehicles, and other state equipment.
45. DAL is agency number 17-564.
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their accounts through the state treasury. The ALJs and case
assistants keep records of the time they spend on cases and work for
each agency. The total hours, usually for the preceding calendar
year, are divided by the hours for a particular agency, which gives a
percentage of the workload for that agency. Generally, that part of
the DAL's total budget (which is IAT) is multiplied by this
percentage to determine the IAT amount owed by each customer
agency for the following fiscal year. If major changes to the caseload
are expected due to new laws or increased enforcement, adjustments
are made. The Office of Planning and Budget within the Division of
Administration handles this function. A few agencies pay an hourly
rate, usually if they are "off-budget" agencies or occasional
customers. Some agencies enter into contracts for DAL's ALJ
services for new or special cases. The DAL Act was amended to
authorize the tribunal to provide ALJs on a contractual basis to any
governmental entity not covered by the act.46 This has allowed DAL
to assist agencies with hearings that are not required to be handled by
DAL.
E. Planning and Performance
DAL's mission statement is "[t]o provide a neutral forum for
handling administrative hearings for certain state agencies, with
respect for the dignity of individuals and their due process rights."47
DAL has an annual operational plan and a five-year strategic plan.48
It has goals, objectives, and performance indicators based upon its
budget, and performance values it is expected to attain.49 Key
performance indicators are reported quarterly and supporting
indicators are reported semi-annually. It is a public, transparent
46. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:999.1 (2008).
47. Division of Administrative Law, Strategic Plan, http://www.adminlaw.
state.la.us/strategicplan.htm (last visited May 12, 2008) (detailing the mission
statement).
48. These are filed with the Office of Planning and Budget (OPB), and can be
viewed on the DAL's website. See DEP'T OF CIVIL SERV. Div. OF ADMIN. LAW,
STRATEGIC PLAN, FY 2008-2009 THROUGH FY 2012-2013, http://www.
adminlaw.state.1a.us/docs/2005-2009%20STRATEGIC%20PLAN.pdf.
49. See Office of Planning and Budget, http://doa.louisiana.gov/opb/lapas/
lapas.htm (last visited May 12, 2008) (reporting on Louisiana Performance and
Accountability System).
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reporting of the agency's input and output of work and its efficiency
in performing that work. Another positive distinction between DAL
and agencies that conduct their own hearings is that DAL's reports of
performance are far more extensive and detailed. No other state
agency, board, or commission that conducts its own hearings collects
or reports as much performance data.o Promptness in handling
hearings and issuing decisions are particular features of this
reporting.
DAL Performance Indicators
(Jan '07 through Dec '07)
Cases docketed
Hearings conducted
Decisions & orders
Settlements
Pre-hearing conferences
Fees assessed
Mediations conducted
10,323
9,348
11,906
809
725
$ 1,327,149
4
50. See Division of Administrative Law, Executive Summary, http://www.
adminlaw.state.Ia.us/docs/DAL%20executive%20summary.pdf (last visited May
12, 2008) (providing performance indicators and benchmarks).
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Performance Indicators Showing Speed and
Efficiency of Operation5'
(Jan. '07 through Dec. '07)
Average length of time from the date docketed to case closed
(i.e., speed of handling cases from beginning to end): 55 days
Average length of time from record closed to decision signed:
6.5 days
Average length of hearings: 25 minutes
Hearings held in less than 30 minutes: 57%
Benchmarking:
Nationwide Comparison with Performance of Other
State Administrative Hearings Panels
* DAL cost per hearing is less than 27% of the Southern
Regional Average among centralized administrative
hearings panels.
* Average DAL ALJ caseload is 536 cases.
* ALJs handle their caseload with no ALJ secretarial staff.
* DAL support staff (primarily the clerk's office) equals
less than 29% of the Southern Regional Average.
* DAL's budget is only 27.2% of the National Average,
while DAL has a larger amount of work relative to that
budget: 36.8% of the average number of cases filed and
52.5% of the average number of decisions and orders
issued.52
51. In order to more accurately represent DAL's typical performance, these
statistics exclude those unusually high volume, quick turnaround, Department of
Labor hurricane disaster unemployment compensation recovery cases that DAL
handled only during FY 07-08.
52. See Division of Administrative Law, http://www.adminlaw.state.1a.us/
director.htm (last visited May 12, 2008). This data is reported in the annual
Operational Plan part of "Budget Request-Division of Administrative Law-Fiscal
Year 2008/2009," a public document.
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The DAL's operation is efficient and cost-effective in delivering
adjudication services. In 2003, DAL's performance was recognized
and its civil servants received an Exceptional Performance award from
the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget.
F. Clerk ofAdministrative Hearings
The clerk's office receives, dockets, and processes cases similar
to a judicial clerk in a state or federal court. New cases are filed only
by agencies, not directly by respondents. The clerk's office prepares
and mails notices of hearings, subpoenas, orders, and decisions, and
posts hearing dockets on the DAL website. New cases are entered
into an electronic case docketing and tracking software system. Case
documents are scanned, and the hearings are electronically recorded
into the system. Computer technology is extensively employed to
increase efficiency, reduce case handling time, and preserve files."
Hearings are assigned by case schedulers supervised by the
clerk's office. Case scheduling involves considering the geographic
venue of where the hearing should be held pursuant to statutes or
rules and the location of the nearest DAL office and available ALJ.
Though ALJs are cross-trained on most areas of law, consideration is
given to the availability of an ALJ having the requisite expertise.
The number and complexity of cases assigned and the number of
days that will need to be left open in the schedule for decision writing
is gauged. Many hearings require travel to field sites, and travel duty
rotates among the judges. A particular AU may be unavailable due
to personal leave, so workloads among the judges should be balanced
as much as possible. The case schedulers consider all these factors in
assigning the cases.
G. Quality Assurance
Quality assurance is integral to an effective central panel
operation. This takes the form of the formal operational and strategic
planning already mentioned, and managing to meet performance
indicators. The DAL Act provides that customers who have
53. An entire article could be written about the operations of the clerk's office,
and improvements implemented by the DAL in terms of information technology,
but that will not be attempted here.
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appeared before the judges shall be surveyed for their comments.5 4
Employees' performance is formally evaluated at least annually. The
DAL is audited for performance measures, property control, and
fiscal procedures. The legislative committees-House and
Governmental Affairs and Senate Governmental Affairs-exercise
oversight and scrutiny of DAL's rules and procedures.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
"[A]dministrative law judges are an integral part of the judicial
enterprise.... One cannot work in government but for a short time
without being enormously impressed with the critical contribution to
the people's business performed by administrative law judges."ss
Agencies are concerned with implementation of agency policy,
but an independent central panel's primary concern is observing due
process as fairly as possible. This requires competent and well-trained
judges. The DAL Act states the essential qualifications for ALJs, their
authority, conduct, evaluations of performance, and protects their
decisional independence.
A. ALJ Qualifications
The ALJ must be a Louisiana resident and licensed attorney56
who has been engaged in the practice of law for at least five years
prior to employment.5 7  Like other DAL employees, ALJs are
54. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:997(C) (2008). The author is not aware of any
similar laws requiring such surveys by agencies that employ their own judges.
55. Sullivan, supra note 4.
56. When the DAL began, a few non-attorney ALJs were transferred from the
Office of Motor Vehicles in the Department of Public Safety (DPS). They were
"grandfathered in" by Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:994(C). As a result of
retirements over the years, at present only one non-attorney ALJ remains who
continues to handle only DPS cases.
57. § 49:994(A). Most ALJs hired have ten to twenty or more years of
experience practicing law. Louisiana Acts Number 23 of the 2008 First
Extraordinary Session of the Louisiana Legislature requires additional
qualifications for DAL ALJs who hear Louisiana Board of Ethics adjudications:
not less than two years of experience as an ALJ or not less than ten years
experience in the practice of law. § 42:1141(C)(4)(a) (effective August 15, 2008).
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classified as civil servants5 8 who are strictly prohibited from any
participation in political activity. Though ALJs are hired by the DAL
director, applications must begin through the formal Department of
Civil Service process. 59  The work of judging is a full-time
profession. 60 Judges are statutory employees of the division61 and
may not be hired as outside contractors. When they become
permanent state employees, they enjoy the protections afforded by
the civil service system and can only be terminated for cause.62 This
insulates them from any political pressure on their decision-making.63
B. ALJAuthority
The ALJ's authority includes: (1) regulating the adjudicatory
proceedings assigned to him; (2) issuing such decisions and orders as
are necessary to promote a fair, orderly and prompt adjudication; and
(3) exercising those powers vested in the presiding officer by the
Administrative Procedure Act.64
The Administrative Procedure Act sets forth the judges' powers
to administer oaths, to set the time and place for continued hearings,
issue subpoenas and discovery orders, to fix the time for filing of
briefs and other documents, and to direct the parties to appear and
58. § 49:992(C).
59. Application for an ALJ position begins like other civil service positions: It
is announced and posted on the Department of Civil Service's website for a limited
time period, and applicants must complete and submit the standard SF-10 form to
human resource personnel. Employees of the Department of Civil Service initially
review the applications for compliance with their rules, and then a list of applicants
is forwarded to DAL supervisors for screening. Writing samples are reviewed,
interviews are conducted, and a test of decision writing and computer usage skills
is given. The candidate's background, references, standing with the bar, and any
bar disciplinary actions or ethics complaints may be checked.
60. Occasionally, flex time or part-time hours are granted.
61. § 49:994(B).
62. See LA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
63. See LA. CONST. art. X, § 9; LA. CIVIL SERV. R. CH. 14.1(e)-(g) (2008);
STATE OF LA., DEPT. OF STATE CIVIL SERV., GENERAL CIRCULAR No. 001691 (Apr.
24, 2007), available at http://www.civilservice.1a.gov/PROGASST/
Gencirc/GENCIRC07/001691.htm.
64. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:994(D) (2008) (granting the ALJs power to
conduct telephone or video hearings and to continue hearings for witnesses called
to military service).
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consider simplification of the issues. 65  The technical aspects of
ALJs' duties comprise a longer list and are similar to those of
agencies' in-house hearing officers. What separates central panel
ALJs from those agency personnel is the duty owed to their
customers: the respondent, the agency, counsel, and witnesses.
Professor Ron Beal suitably described this responsibility:
Their duty is to be charged with the solemn trust to act
fairly and impartially in fulfilling their vested duties.
Each act performed must be done with genuine even-
handedness, compelled by a firm desire to provide to
everyone their due. The overriding goal should be to
shun any action or conduct that would tend to
undermine the faith and confidence of the parties and
the public.66
The DAL ALJs have a unique level of decisional independence
among central panels nationwide. They issue the final decision or
order in cases, and the agency has no authority to override that
decision or order. A losing respondent may appeal to the judicial
(usually district) courts. But neither the agency, nor any agency
official nor any other person acting on the agency's or an official's
behalf, is entitled to judicial review of the ALJ's decision.67 This
provision has been controversial, to say the least. Yet, the legality of
this legislative policy decision was upheld by the state supreme court
in the notable case, Wooley vs. State Farm Insurance Co.,68 which
found that DAL ALJs exercise quasi-judicial powers.
C. ALJ Conduct and Ethics Codes
The ALJs' conduct is governed by the Louisiana Code of
Governmental EthicS69 and the Louisiana State Bar Code of
65. See § 49:956.
66. Beal, supra note 10, at 135 (citing Lewis v. Guar. Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 483 S.W.2d 837, 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)).
67. See §§ 49:992(B)(2)-(3); 49:958.
68. 893 So. 2d 746 (La. 2005).
69. §§ 42:1101-70 (detailing the Louisiana Code of Governmental Ethics).
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Professional Conduct.70 Additionally, DAL developed and instituted
its own "Code of Judicial Conduct for Administrative Law Judges" to
establish and provide guidance to ALJs in maintaining high standards
of judicial and personal conduct.7' Training in ethics and
professionalism is provided to the ALJs and staff each year. The
seriousness of ethical conduct by the ALJs is emphasized by its
inclusion as a distinct factor in each ALJ and case assistant's required
annual Performance Planning and Review document.
D. Requisite ALJ Skills
The job of adjudicator as practiced at the DAL requires a nuts-
and-bolts type of professional. An ALJ must handle a diverse
caseload, travel statewide to conduct hearings, work without a bailiff,
secretary, or law clerk, be proficient in the use of a computer to
perform his own research and writing, and type his own decisions. In
addition to judicial qualities, it requires a high degree of
organizational skills, self-discipline to meet decision writing and case
handling deadlines to keep the docket moving, and the ability to work
with a team of ALJs, administrative hearings clerk's staff, and other
office professionals.
The judge must be able to handle both complex cases argued by
highly experienced attorneys from large law firms and agencies, as
well as simple fact cases with unrepresented parties who do not
understand the hearings process. They should be comfortable
administering justice fairly for all in any scenario. Honing these
skills necessitates regular training.
70. See LA. STATE BAR ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, art. 16 (2007); LA.
RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:222 (2008).
71. Last revised in 2004, it is based upon all of the following: the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct as adopted by the American Bar Association on August 7,
1990; the February 1989 Model Code of Judicial Conduct for Federal ALJs; the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct for State ALJs adopted by the National
Association of ALJs; and the Model Code of Judicial Conduct for State Central
Panel ALJs.
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E. ALJ Training
A high degree of professionalism must be maintained by an ALJ.
The DAL Act requires the development and maintenance of a
program for the continual training and education of the ALJs in
regard to their responsibilities and administrative procedures.72 They
gain proficiency in substantive and procedural law, due process
hearing procedures, evidence, docket management, agency processes,
handling unrepresented parties, judicial demeanor and maintaining
impartiality, computer skills, and much more. ALJs learn techniques
to guide parties wishing to settle cases, and some are trained
mediators.
DAL's training program includes sending ALJs to week long
classes at the National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada, on
conducting fair hearings. DAL's judges attend specialized seminars
sponsored by the National Association of Administrative Law Judges
(NAALJ) and its Louisiana chapter (LAALJ). Several times each
year the DAL hosts its own continuing education seminars. Judicial
district and appellate court judges, and ALJs and chief ALJs from
other states continue to be instrumental in offering their time and
expertise in assisting with training. Speakers include law school
professors, private attorneys, disciplinary counsel from the state bar,
personnel from the Louisiana Board of Ethics, experts in legal
writing, and state agency personnel. Agency participation is most
valuable. When a new area of law is transferred to DAL,
particularized training is given, often by agency personnel with
expertise in that field.
Central panel judges are generalists who handle many types of
cases. Cross-training provides maximum flexibility for case
scheduling and efficient distribution of caseload among the judges.
This differentiates DAL from agencies' own hearing officers who
tend to be narrow specialists in the particular cases of that agency.
Agencies, boards, and commissions do not have state laws requiring
them to conduct training in due process hearings for their
adjudicators. The lack of training concerning how to conduct a due
process hearing might contribute to the impression that some
agencies or boards' hearings processes are not fair.
72. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:996(4) (2008).
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It is not sufficient that an ALJ to be a technical expert in agency
law and policy. The officer of justice should be able to impartially
balance his or her knowledge of the law with sensitivity to the impact
of the application of the law and agency policy on the citizen. The
DAL Act recognizes the need for DAL ALJs to be experts in
administrative due process procedures and attentive to fairness and
objectivity. This combination of expertise and fairness is one of the
advantages of the central panel.73
F. Judicial Performance Evaluations
Unlike Article III judges, DAL ALJs are statutorily required to
undergo at least annual evaluations of their performance.74 Job
reviews are required of all classified civil servants, but the DAL Act
compels the director to develop and implement a program of judicial
evaluation.75 This mandate further distinguishes DAL ALJs from
agencies' own hearing officers: No law requires agencies, boards, or
commissions to be evaluated on how they conduct administrative
hearings. This is a positive distinction.
The statute specifies three areas of judicial performance to be
evaluated: competence, productivity, and demeanor. It covers
judges' consideration of adherence to schedules; courtesy and
attentiveness to the litigants, witnesses, and counsel; knowledge of
the law; analytical, writing, and settlement skills; quantity and quality
of caseload disposition and impartiality. The evaluation should not
include a review of any case results. Judges are evaluated on their
decision-making skills, but not on the outcome of any case.
The evaluations are performed by ALJ supervisors whose duties
include oversight of judicial quality assurance. They train new
judges, make sure that caseloads are fairly distributed, that judges are
available for hearings when there are absences, and that hearings are
being conducted timely. These managers observe hearings, meet
73. During the floor debate on House Bill 41 Rep. Norton stated that using
DAL ALJs is "an excellent idea" since "the Judge would be better able [than the
agency] to make a call; know what they are doing." House of Representatives
Floor Debate on H.B. 41, 2008 1st Extra. Sess. (now La. Acts No. 23), Feb. 15,
2008.
74. § 49:997(F) (providing that performance reviews are confidential documents).
75. § 49:997.
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with agency personnel about improving case handling processes
between the agency and the tribunal, and troubleshoot day-to-day
operational concerns.
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND DECISIONS
A. Hearings
The DAL handles about six to ten thousand hearings per year.
Almost all are handled within one day, and decisions are usually
issued within one week. Though they can vary in complexity, most
hearings involve only a few factual or legal issues. This is typical for
the majority of administrative law cases. A few cases are complex,
multi-day affairs. The judges are trained to handle a diversity of
cases.
Parties do not have to be represented by an attorney; some are but
many are not. An administrative hearing, though comparable to a
small trial, is typically less formal. Hearsay evidence is admissible,
and hearing procedures are more user-friendly to the average citizen.
The hearings are public, and anyone may attend unless a specific
statute makes it confidential (which is rare). Most documents
introduced are subject to the Public Records Act.76 Adjudications are
handled in the manner required by the Administrative Procedure
Act77 and DAL's promulgated rules. 78 Having rules to which all
parties must adhere contributes to the fairness of the process.
Hearings are conveniently located around the state. Convenience
and accessibility to the public and the agencies are balanced with
using an impartial location when reasonably possible. Procedures are
similar to judicial cases, including witness and document subpoenas,
conduct of discovery, confrontation and cross examination of
witnesses, the introduction of evidence, and motion practice. The
purpose and procedures for prehearing conferences are specified in
the DAL Act and are used to simplify and expedite cases. Ex parte
communications with the ALJs are strictly prohibited. 79 ALJs may
76. §§ 44:1-427.
77. See § 49:992(A)(2). See generally §§ 49:950-99.25.
78. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. I, pt. III, ch. 1-7 (2007).
79. § 49:998.
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be recused if they have a conflict of interest in a case that interferes
with their ability to accord a fair and impartial hearing.8 0
B. Decisions
Decision-making and decision writing are skills particular to
judges. Decisions must be in writing, and include findings of fact
and conclusions of law.8 1 They should be clearly written and easily
understood by the average person. Administrative law decisions
should not read like U.S. Supreme Court decisions or heavily
footnoted law review articles. Yet this is not fill-in-the-blank
decision-making. DAL devotes training and supervisory resources to
improving judicial writing. Since judging is its primary function,
DAL is motivated to help its ALJs continually improve these skills as
part of its quality assurance measures. Well-written and clear
decisions also improve public trust and confidence in the
adjudicatory process.
C. Finality; Appeals
As previously discussed, only the respondent to the adjudication,
the party against whom agency action was taken or proposed, may
appeal the decision to a judicial court. The agency is statutorily
denied the right to appeal. The legislature justified this policy
decision based upon the reported practice of agencies using their
personnel and budgetary resources to appeal every case they lost, no
matter how small.82 Responding to an appeal is very expensive. A
respondent might be left with the choice of either paying more in
attorney fees and missing additional work time for the appeal or
paying the proposed fine, even when he had won his case before the
AL. The legislature felt that this was unfair and made a policy
80. § 49:999.
81. § 49:958 (requiring that decisions be delivered to the parties).
82. " [T]he power of government is so overwhelming that if government is
allowed to take any case they want to the Supreme Court, no one will be able to
afford to even begin to participate." Minutes of the Senate and Governmental
Affairs Committee meeting June 9, 1999 on HB 2206 (La. Acts No. 1332) (remarks
in support of the bill by its author, Rep. Charles Lancaster).
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decision to make the DAL ALJ decisions final and unappealable by
agencies and their representatives.
As mentioned, the Wooley v. State Farm case directly attacked
this provision as unconstitutional. Our state supreme court
unanimously disagreed.83 Simply put, the legislature has the legal
prerogative to provide such finality to DAL decisions. The supreme
court's decision is well-written and well-reasoned, and its perusal is
recommended.84
VII. Reviewing the Advantages of the DAL
A. Avoiding the Unavoidable: An Agency's Power to Exert Control
Over its "Own" Hearing Process
State agencies have great power. They make laws through
rulemaking. They interpret their own rules and laws. They create
(often unwritten) policies regarding implementation, administration,
and enforcement of the laws. They create the forms that must be filed
to obtain or renew licenses, make financial disclosures, and otherwise
obey their laws and rules. They control the flow of information
provided in response to inquiries on how to comply with their rules,
forms, and procedures. They control the process by which
compliance occurs. They inspect, audit, review, and investigate
businesses and individuals for compliance. They control the number,
frequency, and intensity of inspections, audits, and investigations.
They can hire or fire, and control the pay and merit raises of the
public servants who are expected to perform these functions. They
take and investigate complaints against those whom they regulate.
They have the power to grant licenses to operate or engage in a
83. Wooley v. State Farm Ins. Co., 893 So. 2d 746 (La. 2005).
84. Although the author was initially asked to submit an article justifying the
Wooley decision from the DAL's perspective and responding to its critics, in the
author's view the decision is self-explanatory and needs no defense. A similar suit
was unsuccessful in federal court by the next Commissioner of Insurance who
sought to have the decisional finality provisions declared unconstitutional, this time
under the U.S. Constitution. Donelon vs. La. Div. of Admin. Law, ex rel. Wise,
No. 07-30482, 2008 WL 821000 (5th Cir. 2008) reh'g denied (Apr. 24, 2008)
(affirming the district court's decision to dismiss the case without a hearing based
upon Donelon's lack of standing to bring the cause of action; the district court had
dismissed based upon Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity).
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profession, or to place restrictions on those licenses, or to deny them,
suspend them, revoke them, or refuse to renew them. Agencies may
bring charges, usually completely at their discretion, against persons
for alleged violations of the rules and laws. The agency decides
whether or not to seek civil monetary or other penalties allowed by
statute, and often the amount and type of penalties. They decide
whether or not to try to settle, mediate or otherwise resolve the
dispute with a respondent short of proceeding to an administrative
hearing. All of this power stays with the agency, even when a central
panel is used for the hearing.
Usually before the agency can take away a property right such as
a license, or enforce civil penalties, constitutional procedural due
process requires that a person be given an opportunity for a hearing.8 5
This right to a predetermination evidentiary hearing is supposed to
enhance the rights of citizens, but if the adjudicator is not fair and
impartial, the citizen's rights may be compromised. An agency can
meet due process by using in-house adjudicators, 86 which are used
often. Agencies may try to create fairness by erecting variously
named "walls" within the agency to shield their employee-
adjudicator from their employee-investigators and employee-
prosecutors.
Some opponents of central panels argue that in-house, or outside
contract ALJs, or board members, can provide equally fair hearings,
or that all that is needed are firewalls within the agency to create
sufficient separations between the prosecutors and adjudicators.87 If
the strict separations that firewalls are intended to create were
rigorously enforced, fairness is theoretically possible. But theories
can be undermined by agencies' natural overriding desire to enforce
their own policies.
85. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see also Wilson v. City of
New Orleans, 479 So. 2d 891 (La. 1985).
86. See Butler v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corrs., 609 So. 2d 790 (La. 1992)
(holding that the fact that the ALJ was employed by and subject to supervision by
the same agency which suspended respondent's license did not violate due
process).
87. Jeff Bush & Kristal Wiitala Knutson, The Building and Maintenance of
"Ethics Walls" in Administrative Adjudicatory Proceedings, 24 J. NAT'L Ass'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1 (2004).
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B. Flames Lapping Under the "Firewalls"
When agencies do not use an independent central panel, they
usually have the power to exercise some level of control over the
administrative hearing and can use that power to their strategic
advantage. First, they can decide how fast the case will be noticed
and set for hearing. When the agency's decision is challenged by a
request for a hearing, it may be less motivated to move the case
toward a speedy resolution when that resolution could be contrary to
their wishes. Unless there is a statute that provides for a deadline to
set a case for a hearing, agencies can receive a citizen's request for
their due process hearing and delay setting the hearing date.
Procedural delays can hamper a citizen's ability to continue in
business. If he has been denied a license renewal, for example, in
some cases the person may have to stop taking or serving customers
or risk illegally engaging in a business without a license, which may
expose him to more severe sanctions. He can lose money, his
business, and his reputation while the months drag on, regardless of
the merits of any defense to the agency's action. Pending charges
may constitute a blemish on the respondent's record, which affects
other licenses or endeavors. This is not meant to presume that any
agency would intentionally interfere in such a way. But the old
adage "justice delayed is justice denied" is true, and delayed justice
can have devastating consequences in administrative law. For
example, if an agency can deny, suspend, or fail to renew a license
pending the fair hearing, a person can be put out of business and
suffer great financial hardship, even if the license or other right is
eventually reinstated after a delayed hearing.
Another factor that may be controlled is where the hearing will be
held. Unless a statute provides otherwise, a person may have to incur
additional expense and lost work time to travel (possibly across the
state) to the agency's office to appear at his in-person hearing.
When a hearing is noticed and conducted in a timely fashion, it is
important that the decision be rendered promptly. A delayed
decision can result in losses as well. If the initial license denial or
revocation were intended to stop the respondent from conducting a
certain business, for example, then an agency could gain that end
without an evidentiary hearing or decision, by controlling the
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hearings process at various points, whether or not the agency also has
employment control over the judge.88
These points are made to explain why an independent tribunal,
particularly a central panel, is better suited to protect due process.
C. Walls Don't Cover Up the Appearance Problem
Chief Judge Tom Ewing of Oregon's central panel made this
statement on the public's perception of partiality when the
prosecuting agency employs the ALJ hearing their case:
The problem with appearance is obvious. However
carefully an agency erects a "Chinese Wall" between
its regulatory staff and administrative law judges
(ALJs), citizens do not know that. If they do know it,
they do not believe it. What citizens know is this:
they are fighting the agency, and they want a fair
hearing. When they enter the hearing room and learn
that the judge presiding over the case is an employee
of their adversary, no explanation will persuade them,
especially if they lose, that the outcome was not
predetermined.89
88. See, for example, the protracted procedural history of Doc's Clinic v. State
ex rel. Department of Health & Hospitals, 07-0480, 2007 WL 3246228 (La. App.
1st Cir. 2007), writ denied 974 So. 2d 665 (La. 2008). On October 26, 2000, the
Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) issued a violation letter to Doc's
Clinic. Id. at 3. A thirteen day administrative appeal hearing was conducted
beginning in December 2001 and ending in January 2002 and submitted for
decision after briefing on February 25, 2002. Id. at 4. More than one year later,
March 23, 2003, the ALJ submitted a 155 page proposed decision to the DHH
secretary wherein he reversed the department's decision. Id. The secretary
adopted the findings of fact but rejected most conclusions of law; Doc's appealed
to the district court, where the judge concluded that the DHH secretary had "acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in signing a decision without first reviewing the entire
administrative record." Id. at 5. After almost five years of remands and appeals,
the original ALJ decision was basically upheld and DHH was assessed court costs
and attorney fees.
89. Hardwicke & Ewing, supra note 36, at 232. The authors also elegantly
respond to the "loss of agency expertise" argument by opponents of central panels.
Id. at 238.
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D. Benefits
Louisiana's centralized administrative hearings tribunal has
helped to improve government. This Article has outlined many of
the benefits. 90  Separation of the investigatory, charging, and
prosecutorial functions from the hearings functions has made
adjudications fairer to citizens and businesses, both in appearance
and reality. Cost and performance efficiencies have improved. DAL
has streamlined the hearings process, realizing economies of scale in
combining hearings duties from various agencies into one.
Flexibility has allowed DAL to improve case scheduling and to
aid agencies with special and short-term caseloads. For example,
during 2007-08, DAL streamlined processes for the Louisiana
Department of Labor and speedily resolved several thousand special
cases for the LDOL: an overload of 2005 Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita disaster unemployment compensation recovery matters. This
kind of adaptability saves the state money that might be wasted if it
had to start up a new program just to handle such cases.
The central panel is an ideal tribunal for political "hot button"
cases. Unlike some agencies and boards, the ALJs are more
insulated from political pressure. Some agencies are pleased to learn
that there exists an impartial administrative tribunal that can
professionally handle sensitive or controversial cases and provide
them political "cover" from a disputatious result.91
Another benefit has been better quality cases. The prosecuting
agency cannot rely upon an independent ALJ to remedy a deficient
case file. They cannot adopt a laissez-faire attitude about sending
every hearing request to the ALJs. This motivates agencies to pursue
only those cases where the evidence supporting the agency's action is
likely to survive an independent review. If not, the agency can
consider whether they should be pursuing the case. Government
90. A good listing of central panels' benefits is made by Allen Hoberg,
Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 75,
76-77 (1994).
91. There have been many instances where agencies, boards, and commissions
that could claim an exemption under the DAL Act have asked DAL to handle
certain cases, which were especially delicate or contentious, or when there existed
too many conflicts of interest among their board members.
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operates more efficiently, and more effectively serves its citizens,
when it avoids insupportable prosecutions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The story of Louisiana's central panel is similar to others. The
resistance to its implementation was fierce and sometimes excessive.
Yet now, almost twelve years later, the agency has survived-even
flourished. DAL enjoys excellent performance reviews and has
recently been legislatively entrusted with expanded jurisdiction.92
Some agencies are pleased with the results and express relief at
having another agency handle their adjudications.
Other agencies continue to resist, especially their loss of control
over the hearing process and the final decision. "This resistance,
however, is proof of the need for a central panel. For the first time . .
. citizens have an opportunity to adjudicate their disputes with
agencies before judges who are truly independent and impartial. This
is not simply good government. It is best government." 93
The story of DAL is best concluded with the simple and direct
words of one citizen who insisted on speaking about his hearing with
the director, who anticipated a complaint. In an assertive manner this
gentleman said: "I lost my case, but I got a fair hearing before a fair
judge, and I can't ask for anything more than that."
Words to remember for any judge.
92. The success of the DAL would not have been possible without the hard
work, skill, professionalism, and dedication to providing good public service of the
judges and operational support staff. With respect and gratitude, I dedicate this
article to them.
93. Ewing, Oregon's Panel, supra note 10, at 89. The author thanks Judge
Ewing for permission to freely use his excellent articles about the formation of the
Oregon panel, which were most instructive. Also thanks to Chief Judge Julian
Mann of North Carolina's central panel, for his outstanding advice and guidance.
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